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JUDICIAL CONTROL OF LAND USE IN FRANCE
Zigurds L. Zilet
INTRODUCTION*
Mature legal systems are property conscious. The bulk of their laws
deal directly with the protection of property and with transactions in-
volving property. Ownership, manifesting itself in powers of alienation,
rights of possession, and rights of use and enjoyment, is scrupulously
guarded. This article deals with the protection of a person's rights in the
use and enjoyment of land against interferences emanating from the
land of another. Such interferences multiply and become more acute
as the local population density increases and as more varied land uses,
especially industrial and commercial uses, are introduced.
Collisions between interests can be averted or minimized by planning
and by advance related administrative measures, or they can be dealt
with after the harm has been felt. But administrative controls never
supply the complete answer and thus, in either case, the aggrieved parties
have to seek the assistance of judicial process under the general prin-
ciples of statutory interpretation and private law.
An initial difficulty becomes immediately apparent in any conflict that
comes before a tribunal. The elimination of an interference with the use
and enjoyment of land for the benefit of complainant A inevitably entails
imposition of restrictions upon the use and enjoyment of land by
respondent B. Yet B's right to use his property to his own advantage
and conduct his affairs in his own way is no less important than the right
of A to use and enjoy his premises. If the judicial decision-maker in-
variably approached 'this dilemma with a compromise solution, litigation
might be encouraged and courts flooded with ludicrous claims. It is per-
haps for this reason that in many, if not all, legal systems only a limited
category of claims is remediable.
In common law countries, the problem is characterized as private
nuisance-a segment of the law of tort. Private nuisance is spoken of,
though not universally, as such use of land as causes a substantial inter-
ference with the use and enjoyment of land by another, if the interference
is intentional, negligent, or arises out of ultrahazardous activity.' Since
all three types of conduct are coupled with a requirement of "unreason-
ableness under the circumstances," much of the case law has developed
t See Contributors' Section, Masthead, p. 347, for biographical data.
* The author wishes to thank Professor Gordon B. Baldwin and Professor Jacob H.
Beuscher of the Wisconsin Law School for their encouragement and valuable advice.
1 Prosser, Torts §§ 70 and 72 (1955); 4 Restatement, Torts § 822 (1939). Newark, The
Boundaries of Nuisance, 65 L.Q. Rev. 480 (1949).
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around this term. The unreasonableness of a course of conduct is ascer-
tained ideally through an elaborate process of weighing the utility of the
conduct against the harm or risk which results.' The tradition of nom-
inate torts, however, leads many a court to neglect such analysis and,
instead, requires it to struggle with dubitable distinctions between tres-
pass to land and nuisance, negligence and nuisance, and the notion of a
single tort and a field of tort liability.8
Justinian's Digest states, as a general principle, "in suo enim alii hac-
tenus facere licet, quatenus nihil in alienum immitat"4 -every person
may act as he pleases on his own property, so long as he immits nothing
on the property of another. Actionable immissions in Roman law ranged
from those of undoubtedly physical matter, like rocks and water, to the
less corporeal smoke and odors. The prohibition perhaps could have been
extended by analogy to include offensive vibrations or light beams but,
subject to certain exceptions, nothing confined within the bounds of one's
property could serve as a basis for a lawsuit. Furthermore, many im-
missions were not actionable because they were so minute and common
that everyone was expected to suffer them.5 Finally, since liability with-
out fault was not known to the Romans, the origin of each damnum was
examined in order to determine whether it had sprung from iniuria. Ini-
uria existed where it was found that the damnum was due to the actor's
culpa (i.e., if it could be attributed to his volition, either because he had
intended the damaging effect or had not been careful enough in avoiding
it).8
German law has preserved the concept of immissiones and refuses to
entertain actions based on purely intangible interferences, such as un-
pleasant sights. Unsubstantial interferences do not give rise to an action,
nor do substantial ones if they are ordinary under the local usage (Ort-
sfiblichkeit) and do not endanger the very basis of the complainant's
existence. Changes in technology and in community structure are ac-
commodated by stretching the "ordinary." Certain other interferences
2 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 1, § 72; 4 Restatement, Torts §§ 826-831 (1939); Beuscher
and Morrison, "Judicial Zoning through Recent Nuisance Cases," 1955 Wis. L. Rev. 440(1955).
8 Van der Merwe v. Carnarvon Municipality (1948), 3 So. Afr. L.R. 613; Southport
Corp. v. Esso Petroleum Co., Ltd. (1953), 3 Weekly L.R. 773, rev'd (1954) 2 Q.B. 182,
rev'd in part sub nom. Esso Petroleum Co., Ltd. v. Southport Corp. (1955), 3 All E. R.
864 (H.L.); noted in (1954) Camb. L.J. 172; Bell v. Gray-Robinson Constr. Co., 265 Wis.
652, 62 N.W.2d 390 (1954). See also Wiggins v. Moskins Credit Clothing Store, 137 F. Supp.
764 (E.D.S.C. 1956).
4 Dig. 8.5.8,§ 5.
5 See generally De Viliers, "Nuisances in Roman Law," 13 L.Q. Rev. 387 (1897). For
shorter references consult: Radin, Roman Law 142 (1927); Buckland and McNair, Roman
Law and Common Law 308-11 (1936), and Burdick, Principles of Roman Law and Their
Relation to Modem Law 363-70 (1938).
6 Grueber, Lex Aguila 12 (1886); Harris, "Liability Without Fault," 6 Tul. L. Rev. 337,
365 (1932); Comment, 6 Tul. L. Rev. 315, 316 (1932).
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are not actionable because they are in the exercise of a servitude, a
sovereign right, or an activity authorized by statute. When monetary
compensation is claimed, the plaintiff must show that the interference
has been intentional or due to negligent conduct (analysis based on de-
lictual liability). This requirement is dispensed with if merely an order
of forbearance is sought (analysis in terms of the proprietary limits of
land) .7
In France, because of relatively recent planning history,8 the resolu-
tion of disputes over conflicting uses of land has in large measure de-
volved upon the courts. This article surveys one and one-half centuries
of French judicial effort to create a body of jurisprudence cognizant of
the complex realities of modern living and consonant with the language
of the Code Civil.
DROITS DE VOISINAGE-NEIGHBORS' RIGHTS
Property rights in France are among the essential guarantees of in-
dividual liberty? Article 544 of the civil code provides:
Ownership is the right to enjoy and dispose of things in the most absolute
manner, provided they are not used in any way prohibited by statutes
or regulations. 10
In the early years of the nineteenth century, the emphasis was on the
word "absolute" and all limitations were strictly construed. This was
perhaps due to the distorted image of the character of ownership in the
7 German B.G.B. §§ 226, 823, 826, 862, 903, 906, 907 and 1004; Wolff and Raiser, Sachen-
recht § 53 (1957); I Great Britain Foreign Office, Manual of German Law 138-140 (1950);
Goldschmidt, English Law from the Foreign Standpoint 124 (1937).
s Salaiin, "Urban Land Policies: France," U.N. Housing and Town and Country Plan-
ning Bulletin No. 7 71 (1953). The principal planning acts are: La loi du 15 juin 1943, re-
lative & lurbanisme, D.A. 1943. L. 94, and Le d6cret no. 56-620 du 23 juin 1956, portant
r6vision du code de l'urbanisme et de I'habitation, D. S. 1956. L. 217. The foregoing ab-
breviations refer to Dalloz, jurisprudence G6n6rale, the primary source of original materials
used in this study. The various collections of Dalloz will be cited as follows:
R6p. - R6pertoire Mithodique et Alphab6tique (1845-1870);
Supp. - Suppl6ment au R6pertoire (1887-1897);
D. - Recueil Daloz;
D. A. - Recueil Daloz Analitique;
D. C. - Recueil Dalloz Critique;
D. H. - Recueil Dalloz Hebdomadaire;
D. P. - Recueil Dalloz P6riodique et Critique;
D. S. - Recueils Daloz et Sirey.
Citations contain the following abbreviations: Chr.-Chroniques; J.-Jurisprudence; L.--
Legislation; Somm.-Sommaires.
9 D6caration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen iv, v and xvii (1789).
10 All translations from French, unless otherwise indicated, are by the author. In de-
scribing persons who advance conflicting claims with respect to the use and enjoyment of
land, the term "owner" also denotes holders of property rights less complete than full owner-
ship, e.g., tenants, usufructuaries, occupants. Such persons may both claim judicial protec-
tion and be sued on the same grounds as owners. See Savatier, Trait6 de la Responsabilit6
Civile 90 (1951). See also Cag6 v. Girard et Voyet, note 132 infra (owner of mere hunting
rights sued).
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Roman law. 1 Later, the attention of legislators, judges and legal writers
shifted to the proviso. Today, limitations upon owners' rights to enjoy
and dispose of their land may be said to fall into two classes: (i) restric-
tions imposed by uncodified statutory law and implementing adminis-
trative regulations,'" and (ii) restrictions found in other civil code pro-
visions, in particular, in articles dealing with servitudes arising from
location, and with general delictual, or prima facie tort, liability. Some-
times a third class, the doctrine of the abuse of rights, is mentioned, but
there is at least some disagreement concerning its nature and attendant
doubt as to whether interferences with the use and enjoyment of land
ought to be analyzed in its terms at all.13
Although our common law nuisance is etymologically French, de-
scribing in both languages a harmful or offensive thing, there is no such
single term, identical or equivalent, in the French legal vocabulary. The
problem of interferences with a person's use and enjoyment of land is
analyzed in terms of rights existing between neighbors-droits de voi-
sinage.
The mutual limitations upon the use and enjoyment of land found in
the code, and the actions to vindicate them, have aspects of both the law
of property and the law of obligations. Thus, the law imposes upon
neighboring landowners various reciprocal obligations, and certain servi-
tudes are established by law or may result from the natural location of
the premises.'" One is allowed to keep trees, shrubs, or bushes near the
boundary of an adjoining estate only at a distance authorized by special
regulations or by uniform and acknowledged custom.15 Plants violating
the legal distance or, in any case, their intruding branches and roots are
subject to removal.'6 Minimum distances, corresponding to side- and
rear-yard restrictions found in our zoning ordinances and in restrictive
covenants, must be observed by users of land who are building struc-
11 Lwy, "The Code and Property," Code Napoleon and The Common-Law World 162,
167 (Schwartz's ed. 1956). On the character of ownership in Roman law, see Schultz, Roman
Law 151-153 (1936).
12 It is difficult to speak of private, as opposed to statutory public land use controls in a
civil law country, as the civil code itself is statutory. It is better to think of code provisions
regulating the reciprocal rights and obligations of private individuals on the one hand, and
police measures outside the civil code on the other. An example of the latter kind is La loi
du 20 avril 1932 tendant & la suppression des fumes industrielles, D. P. [1932]. 4. 180. For
early regulatory measures, see Supp., Proprit6 no. 65.
13 1 Arminjon, Nolde and Wolff, Trait6 de Droit Compar6 § 247 (1950). But see "Acts
Intended to Harm Another and the Doctrine of l'Abus de Droit" infra.
14 Art. 1370, 651, 637 and 639. (All articles cited are from the Code Civil, unless other-
wise indicated.) Most of the droits de voisinage impose upon a landowner a passive attitude.
Only a few require affirmative conduct. These are, however, limited to situations involving
adjoining pieces of land, e.g., the obligations to mark boundaries (homage) and to enclose
lands (d6ture). See Art. 646 and 647, and 1 Planiol, Trait6 lementaire de Droit Civil 740
(1911).
15 Art. 671.
16 Art. 672 and 673.
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tures, e.g., wells, cesspools, chimneys, fire-places, furnaces, stables, or
sheds for storage of corrosive substances, 17 which are potentially harmful
or obnoxious to their neighbors. The rights to light and air are regulated
to some degree."8 Furthermore, every landowner is obliged to slope his
roofs in such a fashion that rainwater is diverted on his own land or on
public highways, but not on the adjacent properties. 9 Actions arising out
of these relations may be brought to obtain either a mere declaration of
the extent of one's proprietary rights20 or to enforce the corresponding
obligations. As a general principle, every obligation to act or not to act
resolves itself in damages in case of non-performance on the part of the
obligor, but the obligee may also demand either that what has been done
in violation of the agreement be destroyed or ask for authorization to
carry out obligations not performed by the obligor, at the latter's ex-
pense.2
But the proprietary limits designated by the code are incomplete. There
is no article dealing directly with such common annoyances as gases,
vapors, odors, smoke, dust, soot, heat, light, noise, vibration, dangerous
structures or unpleasant sights.' This gap had to be closed, therefore,
with the aid of the articles on delictual liability:
Article 1382. Any human act whatever that causes damage to another
obliges the person by whose fault the damage has occurred to make
reparation for it.
Article 1383. Everyone is liable for the damage he has caused not only
by his act but also by his negligence or imprudence.
Article 1384. A person is liable not only for the damage he has caused by
his own act, but also for that caused by the acts of persons for whom
he is responsible or by things under his guard....2P
Article 1385. The owner of an animal, or the person using it during the
period of such use, is liable for the damage the animal has caused,
whether it was under his guard or whether it had strayed or escaped.
Article 1386. The owner of a building is liable for the damage caused
by its collapse when this has been due to its improper maintenance or
defective construction.
These articles, in turn, merely state that damage caused under certain
conditions will result in an obligation to repair it. The conditions are
being gradually worked out by judicial process. This body of juris-
prudence is the French law of tort (responsabilit civile d~lictuelle) and,
17 Art. 674.
18 Art. 675-680.
19 Art. 681.
20 See "Negatory Action (Action N~gatoire)" p. 318 infra.
21 Art. 1142-1145.
22 Compare the German B.G.B. §§ 906 and 907.
23 The omitted paragraphs deal with vicarious liability of parents, masters, employers,
teachers, and artisans.
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therefore, actions arising out of interferences with the use and enjoy-
ment of land, when based on these articles, "sound in tort."
Soon after the Code Napolion had come into effect, French judges
working in the shadow of Article 4,24 were readily according protection
against interferences with the use and enjoyment of land. Ownership, the
courts declared, was not so absolute after all that one could put his
property to a use which, though not contrary to statutes and regulations
specifically referring to land use, was, nevertheless, harmful to another.2 5
The injured person was enabled either to prevent the continuation of the
interference or to exact compensation."'
The same rule was applied to expanding industry. No one could suc-
cessfully defend an action on the ground that he was only using his land,
that he was doing it with the consent of public authorities, and that there
was no statute specifically prohibiting him from doing it.27 In reverence
to Pothier's writings, the definition of ownership underwent covert trans-
formation. It emerged as "the right to dispose of a thing according to
one's pleasure without, however, injuring the rights of another.128 Apolo-
getic opinion was voiced that even if the code had not reproduced this
proposition verbatim, one should not conclude that the modern legislator
had intended to exclude the qualification. 9
During this early period, courts were primarily concerned with the
result of an interference and not with its origin. But there was no criterion
by which results could be characterized as actionable. Some interferences
obviously had to be endured. Thus, in the Affaire Ducasse,0 a smoke
nuisance case, the court said that even if the smoke had not been dis-
sipated by wind, as it had been here, the complaint would have been
dismissed on the ground that an inconvenience of those dimensions was
to be considered a neighborhood encumbrance (charge du voisinage).
Shortly thereafter, however, a test was born in the great case of Derosne
v. Puzin.1
24 "A judge who refuses to give a judgment on the pretext that the law is silent, obscure
or insufficient, may be prosecuted as being guilty of a denial of justice." See generally Von
Mehren, Civil Law System 57-63 (1957).
25 Affaire Lingard, Metz, 10 novembre 1808, and Affaire Mercy, Metz. 16 aofit 1820,
cited in Rip., Propri6t6 no. 166.
26 Affaire Pennetier, Bordeaux, 30 janvier 1839, cited in Rip., Propritd no. 164.
27 Affaire Rigaud-Arbaud, Req., 11 et 12 juillet 1826, and Affaire Ancillon, Nancy, 14
janvier 1830, cited in Rip., Propritd no. 166.
28 Rip., Propri6t6 no. 162. See also Rip., Responsabilit& no. 116. But cf. Anglade v.
Dumont, Req., 13 mars 1827, cited in Rip., Proprit6 no. 165.
29 Supp., Propri~t6 no. 66.
30 Bordeaux, 9 mai 1823, cited in Rip., Propriit no. 160.
31 Derosne litigation consists of the following cases: Trib. civ. Seine, 22 aoft 1840 (Re-
ported in Rip., Industrie et Commerce no. 212); Paris, 16 mars 1841 (ibid.); Civ. 27 no-
vembre 1844 D.P. [1845] 1.13; Amiens, 18 juillet 1845 D.P. [1849] 1.148; Req., 20 f6vrier
1849 (ibid.). It is described as the leading case by Capitant, Note, D.P. [1908] 2.49, and as
the "germ" of the French jurisprudence on the use and enjoyment of land in P~quart v.
Breni~re, Civ., 11 novembre 1896, D.P. [1897] 1.10.
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DEROSNE V. PUZIN
The case involved a collision of interests between an industrial enter-
prise, on the one hand, and a private hospital and two homeowners, on
the other. The litigation extended over eight years and well-nigh ran the
full course of the French review procedure.3 It deserves a detailed ex-
amination as the first case in which the Cour de Cassation was genuinely
concerned about the problem of conflicting land uses. The arguments of
the counsel and the courts' opinions trace the-history of the law of inter-
ferences and the consecutive judgments are illustrative of the role of the
judiciary in the growth of French law.
The complaint before the Tribunal Civil de la Seine was simple:
Derosne's chemical works was giving off odor, smoke, and noise to the
plaintiffs' annoyance. The tribunal awarded damages to the plaintiffs and
Derosne appealed. The Cour d'Appel de Paris affirmed the decision.
Derosne now sought a pourvoi33 for an alleged violation of Article 544
and an incorrect application of 1382.
In the Cour de Cassation, Derosne argued that, apart from the lan-
guage of Article 544, there was a principle of freedom of industry under
equal conditions. Courts, he said, apparently fancying unregulated strife
between industry and owners of surrounding properties, felt called upon
to intervene to protect the interests of the latter. This thinking, according
to 'the petitioner, was a relic of the days of kings, especially Louis XIV,
when everything was given to industry to spur its growth, with the courts
left to safeguard the interests of the other property owners. During that
era a distinction between public inconveniences (inconv~nients g~n~raux)
and private inconveniences (inconv~nients personnels) had been de-
veloped by the judiciary. As for the former, that is 'those which affected
everybody in his health, comfort and safety, they were admittedly cov-
ered by administrative authorization, or by the proper nature of the
industry if its exercise was not subject to prior authorization. But where
a neighbor had suffered an inconvenience peculiar to him, e.g., one due
to the proximity of the source, courts would hear his claim.34 The dis-
tinction, Derosne contended, had been erased by the Revolution of 1789
which abrogated the privileges of industry, as well as by subsequent legis-
lation. Soon thereafter, a group of scientists had been entrusted with
working out a system of standards whereby the insalubrious or annoying
32 For an outline of the judicial hierarchy in France, see David and De Vries, French
Legal System 34-35 (1958).
33 Pourvoi en cassation-a review by the Cour de Cassation for error of law.
34 On the same distinction, Rep., Industrie et Commerce no. 211. Note the resemblance
to the public-private nuisance distinction in the Common Law. See Prosser, op. cit. note 1,
supra § 71.
[Vol. 45
1960] JUDICIAL CONTROL OF LAND USE IN FRANCE 295
character of industrial establishments was to be determined. The pro-
posed classification had been enacted by le dicret du 15 Octobre 1810.
One consequence of this decree was that the establishments which had
been omitted from the listing no longer were left to the mercy of their
neighbors. The right of the latter to demand removal or shut-down of
manufacturing enterprises had been abolished. Le d9cret had the further
effect of taking away from the courts and giving to administrative author-
ities the competence to decide up to what point and under what con-
ditions business enterprises in the vicinity of residential areas had to be
tolerated. Therefore, freedom of industry was the rule and the classifica-
tion, with its impediments, the exception. The legislation of 1810 was
plenary, except that it covered neither physical accidents (accidents ma-
tiriels) arising in the course of actual operations, nor an abuse of the
express authorization. It was in these instances, and in these instances
only, that the matter returned to the domain in which courts could act as
protectors of the rights of the use and enjoyment of land. The challenged
judgment, concluded Derosne, therefore had erroneously interpreted and
violated the decree of 1810 and was without legal effect.
In contrast to this, Puzin contended that it was an accepted principle
that the administrative authorization was solely in the public interest
and that it left the rights of third persons intact. Moreover, this principle
rested upon uncodified statutes and the code itself. First, la loi du 24
Aofit 1790 provided that any damage to property entailed an obligation
to compensate its owner. Second, Article 544 forbade utilization of prop-
erty in a manner contrary to statutes and regulations. Indeed, declared
Puzin, this principle had been recognized by Derosne himself, who had
conceded that physical accidents would give rise to claims for com-
pensation. This was a tacit recognition of the principle that administra-
tive regulation rested upon respect for the rights of third persons. Puzin
therefore urged that the challenged judgment was correct.
The Cour de Cassation, without any hesitation, rejected the poaurvoi
for that part of the judgment which dealt with the effects of smoke. Ap-
parently it had been feasible, without detracting from the operational
efficiency of the plant, to obviate this kind of harm. Derosne was con-
demned to pay damages for not having taken the necessary precautions.
The second part of the opinion dealt -with the question of noise in the
light of Articles 544 and 1382. The Court posed the fundamental issue
very succinctly:
... on the one hand, one cannot disregard the fact that the noise caused
by the factory, when it bears down upon the neighboring properties to an
intolerable degree, may give rise to a legitimate claim for indemnity
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
and . . . , on the other hand, one cannot consider every kind of noise
created by industry as constituting indemnifiable harm.34a
The Court then proceeded to lay down a test:
[T]he challenged judgment rests, it is true, upon the intensity of the
noise created by the appellant's factory, but .. . in declaring that this
noise has been offensive to the neighboring properties, the judgment fails
to indicate that the noise has affected them continuously and to a degree
exceeding the measure of the ordinary obligations of the neighborhood
[la measure des obligations ordinaires du voisinage] 34b
For this reason, and for the reason that the challenged judgment had
ordered indemnity for anticipated harm, thus ignoring the possibilities
of attenuation or accentuation of the noise and the possible cessation of
the operations entirely, that part of the judgment condemning the noise
was reversed and sent to a different cour d'appel. 5
The Cour d'Appel d'Amiens held that:
The exercise of ownership rights is limited not only by statutes and regu-
lations but also by the requirement to respect the ownership rights of
another. When it is found that the harm to the property of another is
the result of exaggeration of the rights to use and enjoy one's property,
it is a quasi-dilit which obliges the actor to repair the harm he has caused.
The proprietor of an industrial enterprise cannot rely on the administra-
tive classification in his defense. These administrative formalities which
must precede the commencement of operations have to be complied with
only in the interest of the police and for the sake of public safety. They
do not preclude the application of droit commun by courts when a neighbor
has been affected by inconvinients particuliers. The proof shows that
the noise produced by Derosne's works has been very intense and has
exceeded the measure of the ordinary obligations of the neighborhood. 36
Now it was for Derosne to bring a pourvoi once again. He did so
assigning two grounds; first, improper application of Articles 1382 and
1383 and violation of la loi du Mars 1791," in that the judgment, with-
out having imputed to him any negligence, imprudence, or violation of
specific land use statutes or regulations, had nevertheless adjudged him
liable to compensate his neighbors for harm allegedly caused by his busi-
ness; and second, violation of the classification decree of 1810 and of
the statutes ordaining the separation of powers, in that there was no
judicial authority competent to award damages for inconvinients parti-
34a D.P. [18451 1. 13, 14-15.
34b Id. at 15.
35 This judgment has been characterized as embodying "une conception un peu trop
individualiste du droit de proprift" and therefore quite unsustainable. Ripert, Note D.P.
[19071 1. 385. The criticism apparently is directed against the decision on its merits and
not against the test which is sufficiently flexible to permit further judicial experimentation.
36 D.P. [18491 1. 148. The court also held that the judgment had properly foreseen pos-
sible variations in the intensity of harm.
37 Art. 7 of this statute proclaimed freedom of work and industry on condition of ob-
taining a license. See Rep., Industrie et Commerce no. 32.
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culiers emanating from an administratively regulated industry. The
Chambre des Requites rejected the pourvoi on the following grounds:
(i) The rights established by Article 544 are limited by the natural and
legal obligation to cause no harm to another; (ii) The Act of 1791 pro-
ceeds on the same principle; (iii) Even when a controversy involves
classified establishments, which can and do exist only by administrative
sanction, third parties, nonetheless, have a right to claim reparation
upon demonstrating that the interference with their land has exceeded
the measure of the ordinary obligations of the neighborhood; (iv) The
facts show that the noise created by Derosne's factory has exceeded this
measure; (v) In disputes between third parties and classified establish-
ments, courts alone are competent to take cognizance of the claims ad-
vanced by the former and to award appropriate relief; (vi) There is
even less reason to assert that courts act beyond their powers when they
entertain claims against nonclassified establishments.
The outstanding result of the Derosne litigation was the unequivocal
assertion by the judicial branch of its competence to protect private
individuals against interferences with their use and enjoyment of land
even in administratively regulated sectors. The settlement of the pro-
tracted controversy also produced a test to be used in separating action-
able from nonactionable interferences-the measure of the ordinary ob-
ligations of the neighborhood. Nevertheless, the courts had failed to
explain their decisions in a manner satisfactory to legal theoreticians.
They had neglected to connect, in an orderly way, the definition of
ownership, the principle of general delictual liability found in Article
1382, and the new test of neighborhood obligations."8
LA FAUTE-THE CONNECTING LINK
General Considerations
By virtue of the proviso in Article 544, legitimate exercise of owner-
ship ceases when the property is used in a manner prohibited by statutes
or regulations. That is by no means an astounding proposition. Yet, for
some reason, it has been seriously believed that when the thing owned
is land, the prohibition ought to be specific. In due time Article 1382
became the source of judicial power to restrict the rights of the use and
enjoyment of land.3 9 From then on, in so far as the fundamental respect
38 Capitant, Note, D.P. [1908] 2. 49.
39 It is perhaps not quite realistic to suggest that phenomena which are labeled nuisances
in our law, belong in the pidgeon-hole of property in the French system. While this might
be said about German law, in France the quarrel is not just over the ambit of ownership
with claims for reparation of harm being merely incidental. When the limits of ownership
are traced almost exclusively by means of principles of delictual liability-responsabilit6
civile d~lictuelle, one would rather think of the property aspect as being subsidiary. Cf.
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for the equal rights of others was concerned, an owner of a tract of land
has been accorded the same treatment as has an owner of a whip.
Article 1382 prohibits a person, under a threat of an obligation to
make reparation, from causing damage to another by his fault. Although
"fault" is an amorphous term, French courts have given it content. It
has been professed that the word "fault," in the context of interferences
with the use and enjoyment of land, describes (i) acts intended to harm
another, or (ii) acts that are harmful to another and arise out of negli-
gence or imprudence imputable to the actor, or (iii) acts merely harmful
to another if the harm is greater than ought to be tolerated (fault by
implication) .o
It should be recognized that this classification is helpful only to a
point. It has an aura of artificiality as has any attempt to make order
out of concepts that have been created in response to immediate needs
but without much regard for logical symmetry. As a matter of fact, it
has been a profuse source of disagreement among French jurists. While
the first two categories reflect the traditional view of wrongful conduct,41
the third has been contrived relatively recently to span the gap between
the judicial practice and a lagging theory.42 This fault by implication is
determined by a quantitative or objective standard (the ordinary obliga-
tions of the neighborhood) as opposed to an, at least, partly subjective
standard (the actual or imputed state of mind of the actor). 3 Thus, in
solving the same clashes of interests, the French are still using the notion
of fault tinged with personal blame side by side with fault derived from
social necessities and not necessarily coinciding with human wickedness.
Lawson, Common Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law 142-145 (1955). Louisiana has ex-
perienced similar controversies over the classification of nuisance. The choice is influenced,
on the one hand, by Art. 2315 (an exact copy of Art. 1382, Code Civil) and, on the other,
by Arts. 667-669 (defining proprietary limits) of the La. Civil Code. In an effort to find
a solution it has been suggested that the proprietary articles have established a "rule of
neighborliness'--a two-headed concept which, in its property aspect, allegedly creates a
right in a person not to be harmed in the use and enjoyment of his own land by activities
of his neighbor which exceed a certain standard, and, in its tort aspect, defines a duty, the
violation of which is fault within the meaning of Article 2315. See Stone, "The Loesch Case
and Article 667," 17 Tul. L. Rev. 596, 599-600 (1943). But cf. Devoke v. Yazoo & Mis-
sissippi Valley Railroad Company, 211 La. 729, 30 S.2d 816 (1947) in which the court cited
indiscriminately the three articles and excerpts from American Jurisprudence and con-
cluded:
Clearly, therefore, the plaintiff's action is not one in tort, but, rather, one that springs
from an obligation imposed upon property owners by the operation of law so that all
may enjoy the maximum of liberty in the use and enjoyment of their respective
properties. Id. at 743.
40 Ripert, Note, D.P. [1907] 1. 385.
41 Rep., Responsabilit6 no. 170 (the bases of liability: fait positif, negligence, impru-
dence). Ed. note, D.P. [1857] 1. 293 (rights cannot be exercised for evil ends; precautions
must be taken). By "traditional" is meant the view prevalent at the time of the birth of the
Code Civil.
42 Ripert, Note, D.P. [1907] 1. 385.
43 Josserand, Note, D.P. [1913] 2. 177. For a related analysis, see R6p., Responsabilit6
no. 116.
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The development of fault by implication as a basis of liability is a step
toward realizing the suggestion that liability ought to rest simply upon
conduct which is socially unreasonable, or, to put it another way, in a
society in which the diverse interests of its members must inevitably
clash, fault ought to appear as soon as one makes himself "intolerable."'4 4
Acts Intended to Harm Another and the Doctrine of l'Abus de Droit
The doctrine of the abuse of rights is found, in some form, in almost
all civil law jurisdictions; in France it is invoked very frequently.45 The
doctrine seems to have originated in connection with the exercise of
ownership and it has been intimated that this concept most closely re-
sembles the common law nuisance.48 According to the underlying phi-
losophy of the abuse of rights, a right is granted for a socially useful
purpose and cannot lawfully be exercised in a manner inconsistent with
that purpose 47 However, writers disagree about the role of this doctrine
in cases concerning interferences with the use and enjoyment of land.
Although not so put, the central issue is determining what right has been
abused: the right to use and enjoy one's land, or the right reasonably to
harm another in the exercise of his equal rights, by such use and en-
joyment?
On the one hand, it can be argued that there exists, within the scope
of droits de voisinage, no right to harm one's neighbors and that we can
properly refer only to the right to use and enjoy land. Therefore, in all
cases in which the actor is able to prevent harm to another, he is liable
if harm ensues. To speak of an abuse of rights in case of his failure to
do so, is merely to call an intentionally harmful or negligent act by a
different name.4 It is true that in a broader context the term "abuse of
rights" has been equated to the frontier of the law of tort where recurring
clashes between conflicting rights are hammering out rules of tort law.49
But, so conceived, l'abus de droit would again be only another name for
such mental images as iniuria and faute in a legal system that recognizes
general delictual liability. In each case it is for the judicial decision-
maker, under his "residuary power of judicial legislation," to give content
to these otherwise vacuous words as new situations arise. 0
44 See Prosser, op. cit. note 1, supra at 6 and 14-16, and Savatier, Note, "la faute ap-
paralt ds qu'on se rend 'insupportable'" D.P. [1928] 1. 73.
45 Surveyer, "A Comparison of Delictual Responsibility in Law in the Countries Gov-
erned by a Code," 8 Tul. L. Rev. 53, 80 (1933) ; Comment, 7 Tul. L. Rev. 426, 432 (1933).
46 Amos and Walton, Introduction to French Law 256-57 (1935); Lfwy, op. cit. note
11, supra at 167; Lawson, op. cit. note 39, supra at 144.
47 Gutteridge, "Abuse of Rights," 5 Camb. L. J. 22, 35 (1933); Walton, "Motive as an
Element in Torts in the Common and in the Civil Law," 22 Harv. L. Rev. 501 (1909).
48 Savatier, Note, D.P. [1928] 1. 73.
49 Lauterpacht, Function of Law in the International Community ch. XIV (1933).
50 For an excellent statement of the problem, see Stone, Province and Function of Law
203 (1950).
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Other authorities, however, list droits de voisinage among droits per-
mettant de nuire & autrui.5 If this is correct, we are speaking of a right
that has, by its nature, the quality of being able to harm another without
involving any fault. With this approach the question of abuse can arise.
To this end, we ought to inquire whether, in the presence of the right to
harm another, all the damage caused within the framework of such right
was necessarily and absolutely exclusive of any responsibility on the part
of the actor, or whether it is necessary to find liability because the right
in question has been exercised in a morally unjustifiable manner. The
recognition of a quantitatively determinable fault seemingly lends sup-
port to the argument that the exercise of droits de voisinage is capable
of harming others without involvement of any fault. There are infinite
gradations of harm located between the point of harmless inactivity of a
user of land and the point at which the harm is said to exceed the measure
of the ordinary obligations of the neighborhood. It is quite clear that
while cautious and considerate conduct, though resulting in harm quan-
titatively within these limits, would be rightful, the same amount of
harm could give rise to an obligation if the actor were causing it mali-
ciously. He would have "abused his right." But a moment's reflection
reveals a dissimilarity between the right of self-defense, right to prose-
cute, right to compete, etc., on the one hand, and the right to use and
enjoy one's land on the other. In the first instance, the actor, in exer-
cising his rights, directs his acts against his assailant, adversary or com-
petitor with the specific purpose of undermining the position of the latter.
If this purpose is not balanced out by the actor's reasonable desire to
advance his own interests, we could speak of an abuse of rights. Quite
on the contrary, the exercise of the right to use and enjoy one's land or,
for that matter, any property, does not call for acts specifically directed
at weakening a neighbor. As the owner of a whip is held responsible for
scars inflicted through his acts intended to have that result, without any
talk of an abuse of rights, so ought the owner of a tract of land be held
strictly answerable for his noxious acts.
The abuse of rights doctrine could, however, have value in those in-
stances in which a landowner uses his land in a manner that, though not
interfering with the corresponding rights of others, is, nonetheless, detri-
51 Petit Dictionnaire de Droit 1109 (Reau and Rondepierre ed. 1951); 2 Arminjon, Nolde
and Wolff, Trait6 de Droit Compar6 § 373 (1950); Les Grands Arr8ts de la Jurisprudence
Civile 283-84 (de la Morandi~re ed. 1950). The following are commonly listed as rights
permitting harm to another person: right of competition; right of self-defense; right to
safeguard professional, economic, social and religious interests; right of literary and
artistic critique; right to give unfavorable references; right to prosecute. The latter seems
to be the most active area. See Mignon, Les Instances Actives et Passives et la Th6ore de
l'Abus du Droit, D. 1949. Chr. 183.
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mental to society. Such might be the waste of scarce natural resources or
the refusal to turn the land over to production in limes of dire need. In
those cases, indeed, the abuse would be of the right to use and enjoy
one's property and not of the right to harm another thereby.la
"Spite structures" provide the classical example of acts intended to
harm another. In Doerr v. Keller,52 the defendant had built a dummy
chimney for the sole purpose of darkening a skylight in his neighbor's
roof. The court ordered the chimney torn down saying that, although, in
principle, property rights were in a certain sense absolute entitling the
owner to use or abuse his property, their exercise had to have as a limit
the satisfaction of an intir~t ligitime. Precepts of morality and equity
were opposed to the law sanctioning acts inspired by malice and per-
formed under the domination of an evil passion not justified by any per-
sonal advantage to the person acting, and causing serious damage to
another. The case of Coquerel v. Climent-Bayard" is cited not only for
its somewhat amusing facts but also as the favorite illustration of the
abuse of rights doctrine applied to interferences with the use and enjoy-
ment of land. Here, the defendant, whose land adjoined the grounds oc-
cupied by builders of dirigible balloons, erected on his land huge elevated
platforms bristling with sharp iron spikes. In due course the defendant's
wish came true as the belly of one of the plaintiffs' airships was slit by
the defendant's contraptions. The tribunal awarded money damages to
the plaintiffs and ordered Monsieur Coquerel to dismantle the mis-
chievous devices within a fortnight counting from the day of judgment.
The Cour de Cassation recognized that the harm to the neighbors had
been a means and not an end, the real motive being to compel Clement-
Bayard to purchase the defendant's property at an inflated price, but
felt that this circumstance should not affect the applicability of the doc-
trine and affirmed the judgment.
There may be still other forms of abusive conduct. In Badoit v.
Andr654 and Forissier v. Chaverot,55 the defendants had installed pumps
in their mineral water springs drawing the precious water away from the
nearby springs of their neighbors and allowing it to flow away unused.
This conduct was again held to constitute an abuse of their rights of
ownership. In Prince de Wagram v. Marais,6 the defendant Prince had
rila For an account of experiments in this direction, see Greaves, "The Social-Economic
Purpose of Private Rights--Section 1 of the Soviet Civil Code-A Comparative Study of
Soviet and Non-Communist Law," 12 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 165, 439 (1934).
52 Colmar, 2 mai 1855 D.P. [18561 2. 9.
53 Req., 3 aoet 1915, D.P. [1917.1 1. 79.
54 Lyon, 18 avril 1856, D.P. [1856] 2. 199.
55 Req., 10 juin 1902, D.P. [1902] 1. 454.
56 Paris, 2 d~cembre 1871, D.P. [1873] 2. 185,
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posted his servants, equipped with noisy instruments, along the limits of
his property in order to create an organized disturbance, frighten the
wildlife on his neighbor's land and thus spoil the latter's chase. The court
awarded Fr.3,000 to the plaintiff. Years later, a similar instance of Gallic
resentment was again resolved in favor of a plaintiff on the ground of
the abuse of rights.57 In Cr6dit Lyonnais v. Ardisson,8 the defendant,
while fully aware of the unstable soil conditions in the City of Cannes,
allowed an immense pile of rocks to be accumulated on its land which,
by subsiding, aggravated the already defective construction of Ardisson's
house. The Cour de Cassation invoked Articles 544 and 1382 and found
liability on the ground of the abuse of rights.
All the foregoing examples, except Cridit Lyonnais, can be explained
as cases of fault through intentionally harmful acts. Had the chimney
been genuine, the towering spiked structures socially useful, the mineral
water bottled, and the clatter caused by a normal activity, there would
not have been any grounds for an action, notwithstanding the fact that
the neighbors would have been visited by the identical quantum of harm.
The quality of the defendants' conduct made all the difference. In Cr&dit
Lyonnais, on the other hand, no intention to do harm is shown, but the
same result could have been reached on the basis of fault by negligence
or imprudence, or on the basis of quantitatively calculated fault.
The burden of proving a defendant's malicious intent is upon the
plaintiff. Although the matter to be proved is subjective, courts do allow
empirical proof, and assume that an act harmful to another and without
benefit to the actor himself, is explainable only by the actor's desire to
hurt the former.59
Acts Harmful to Another and Arising out of Negligence or Imprudence
Imputable to the Actor
The civil code provides that an obligation to redress a harm done can
arise not only out of intentional acts but also out of negligent or im-
prudent conduct.6" Therefore, when a person has failed to take the rea-
sonable precautions necessary to avoid harmful interferences with the
use and enjoyment of land by another, he may be adjudged liable for
past harm and/or required to prevent its future recurrence.
In Barthelemy v. Sinas,' the defendant dug a large hole in his land
just one meter off the plaintiff's property line and used the hole to pre-
57 Bouteville v. Asou, Amiens, 7 fivrier 1912, D.P. [1913] 2. 177.
58 Req., 23 mars 1927, D.H. [1927] 239, D.P. [1928.] 1. 73. The court's reasoning was
strongly criticized in Savatier, Note D.P. [1928] 1. 73.
59 Josserand, Note, D.P. [1913] 2. 177.
60 Art. 1383.
61 Civ., 8 juin 1857, D.P. [1857] 1. 293.
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pare fertilizer out of cesspool residue and a solution of lye. In this process
he intermittently raked the solids onto the edge of the pit while allowing
the liquid to flow through small distributive ditches along the boundary.
S~n~s brought suit complaining of "fetid and nauseating evaporations."
The tribunal saw no basis for the action, but the Cour d'Aix reversed the
decision and awarded Fr.300 to the plaintiff. The appeals court also re-
quired Barth6lemy either to close the pit or to remove it to a spot at least
50 meters from the plaintiff's land. The Cour de Cassation held that
Article 1382 had been correctly applied. The fault was established by
showing that the defendant had created an offensive installation and had
neglected to take the precautions appropriate to insure that no other
person would be harmed."' Further, the Court said, it was within the
province of the judiciary to pass upon the inefficacy or impossibility of
the execution of any proposed means aimed at abating the interference,
and to determine and prescribe such means as would attain that end.
Fault, in negligence cases, refers to the standard of conduct of the
reasonable man. In order to give legal content to this broad standard,
customary behavior and the prevailing patterns of conduct are taken
into account. The question whether the complained of conduct has met
this measure of reasonableness raises an issue of law and is reviewable
by the Cour de Cassation.6 - Unfortunately, the application of this stand-
ard does not dispose of the underlying problem. It would be easy to
suppose that the negligence or imprudence so determined has the same
effect as acts intentionally harmful, i.e., that a person bringing harm
upon another through his negligence or imprudence is liable to the latter,
notwithstanding the fact that the particular harm registers on the scale
of interferences below the point of the ordinary obligations of the neigh-
borhood. Perhaps the policy should be to prevent all interferences that
are reasonably foreseeable and avoidable. 64 However, court decisions are
not so reasoned. Thus, in Sociftj Mini~re des Terres Rouges v. Poncier
et Grosse,6 5 the SocitY, an operator of blast furnaces, had installed an
unscreened concrete cool-house at the extreme boundaries of its property
in such a fashion that it was continuously emitting vapors damaging to
62 Accord: Vandangeon v. Favreau, Civ., 7 f~vrier 1894, D.P. [1894] 1. 239 (matter
from untight manure pits seeping into neighbors' wells).
63 David et al., op. cit. note 32, supra at 106-107; Nourrigat v. Pech, Civ., 28 f6vrier
1910, D.P. [1913] 1. 43. The courts look for an alleged "preexisting duty."
04 Petit Dictionnaire, op. cit. note 51, supra at 1108. If the exploitation of land has
caused an easily preventable harm (albeit non-excessive) there will arise an obligation to
repair it, if the actor could have prevented it "without hurting his legitimate rights." Rep.,
Responsabilit6 no. 116. Savatier supports the view that a neighbor ought to be responsible
for all intentionally inflicted harm. Savatier, op. cit. supra note 10 at 91. But it is most
likely that he assumes some requirement of "substantiality."
05 Colmar, 19 mai 1938, DM. [1938] 425.
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the plaintiffs' properties. Plaintiffs recovered damages in the tribunal and
the Socit6 appealed. Having found that the harm could have been pre-
vented by either constructing the cooler at some other place or by prop-
erly screening it, the cour d'appel affirmed the decision reached below.
The general rule was stated as follows:
: ..an owner who, by the manner in which he uses and occupies his
immovable property, causes to his neighbors harm exceeding the limits
of the ordinary obligations of the neighborhood is at fault if he neglects
to take precautions which have to be taken in order to prevent these
inconveniences.6sa
The Cour de Cassation has formulated the rule in substantially the
same words. Monsieur Joachim, the plaintiff in Socit6 Maurel et Prom
et Maurel Fr~res v. Joachim,66 was a manufacturer of sail-cloth in Bor-
deaux. He charged that the defendants, his neighbors and operators of
oil works, had done harm to his business by firing their boilers with walnut
shells-an operation which produced smoke saturated with grease and
soot. The tribunal found that the smoke produced by this type of com-
bustion was more troublesome than that created by normal fuel and that
the dense fumes had periodically penetrated the plaintiff's shop with
hurtful effects. The Cour de Cassation rejected the defendant's pourvoi,
thus approving the award of damages by the court below. It held that a
manufacturing enterprise which, by the use of its land, had exceeded the
measure of the ordinary neighborhood inconveniences was at fault if it
had neglected to take precautions it should have taken. The high Court
has reiterated this principle quite recently in Cie du Mines de la Grand'-
Combe v. Scaramus.7
The rule, as stated, requires the coincidence of two conditions in order
to establish fault: interference that exceeds the ordinary obligations of
the neighborhood and failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent
such interference. Knowing that an interference that exceeds the measure
of the ordinary obligations of the neighborhood gives rise to a fault by
that very fact,"8 it is difficult to imagine why any plaintiff would present
evidence showing a failure to take precautions. One explanation, of
course, is that this is merely an instance of logical inconsistency, a phe-
nomenon by no means unusual in the area of nuisance. Another is that
"ordinary obligations" in this context simply mean that, in order to give
rise to liability, the resultant harm has to have some "substantiality. '' 680
65a Id. at 426.
66 Req., 17 novembre 1931, D.H. [1932] 1.
67 Req., 24 janvier 1944, D.A. [1944] J. 45. Accord: Courret v. Lassus, Civ., 28 mai
1952, D. 1953. Sornm. 11 (dust of lime and cement).
68 See "Fault by Implication" p. 305 infra.
68a See supra p. 303 and note 64.
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There are also confusing references to aggravation of fault. In Dr. Secret
v. Briquet, 9 the Cour de Cassation rejected a pourvoi against the judg-
ment of an appeals court awarding Fr.5,000 to the plaintiff, a radio tech-
nician and dealer. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff's neighbor, Dr.
Secret, had been using in his office a device for radio-therapy which
emitted waves interfering with nearby radio reception. Despite the fact
that the defendant had been informed of this, he continued to use the
apparatus. As a result, the plaintiff had been unable to conduct satis-
factory sales demonstrations and lost clientele. The Court held that the
exercise of the rights of ownership created liability when the harm to an-
other exceeded the measure of the ordinary obligations of the neighbor-
hood. It noted that the defendant's fault had been aggravated by his
negligence to stop completely, or to limit to certain hours, the inter-
ferences with his neighbor's business.7"
Some insight into the reasons for these difficulties is gained by an
examination of the contents of the concept of "fault by implication."
Fault by Implication
If relief were given only in cases of intentionally harmful acts and
against interferences attributable to negligence or imprudence, many
interferences would not be actionable. Among these non-actionable inter-
ferences would be those resulting from generally beneficial uses, e.g.,
smoke from railway locomotives, odor from oil refineries, noise from
boiler factories, lights from skating-rinks. However, a long line of de-
cisions has established that, despite the fact that all reasonable precau-
tions, short of cessation of activities, have been taken, mere interferences
with the use and enjoyment of land are actionable, if they exceed the
measure of the ordinary obligations of the neighborhood.71 This line of
authority certainly refers as far back as Derosne v. Puzin.72 In Cie du
Chemin de Fer d'Orl~ans v. Desforges et Chalon,73 the Cour de Cassation
89 Civ., 29 mal 1937, D.H. [1937] 393.
70 This is contrary to the principle that there are no degrees of fault. Amos et al., op. cit.
supra note 46, at 250.
71 Capitant, Note, D.P. [1908] 2. 49.
72 See note 31, supra. Accord: Tharaud v. De Masiambout, Civ., 14 juillet 1875, D.P.
[1876] 1. 447 (oily smoke from a china factory); Cie. G6n6rale d'Imprimerie v. de Rohan-
Chabot, Civ., 20 janvier 1891, D.P. [18911 1. 153 (noise of printing presses); De Chabaud-
Latour v. Gaveau, Tr. civ., Seine, 18 juin 1908, D.P. [1908] S. 63 (noise of a piano store
and music rooms); Martin v. Cie. des Vernis Valentine, Tr. civ., Lyon, 17 juin 1950, D.
[1951] Somm. 7 (emanations from a varnish plant).
73 Req., 3 janvier 1887, D.P. [1888] 1. 39. Accord: N. v. Chemin de Fer du Midi, Bor-
deaux, 21 juin 1859, D.P. [1859] 2. 187 (fire damage from railroad); Mineur v. Bertrand,
Metz, 25 aofit 1863, D.P. [1864] 2. 111 (loading noise and obstruction of sidewalk); Pilt6
v. Lapha, Orl~ans, 22 novembre 1889, D.P. [1891] 2. 120 (noise from a bakery); Bottin
v. Gemouliat, Req., 7 d6cembre 1909, D.P. [1910] 1. 95 (fertilizer plant emitting dangerous
substances); Roy v. Bonneau, Req., 3 juin 1926, D.P. [1926] 1. 217 (interference with the
flow of surface water).
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said that the plaintiffs were not required to prove that the railroad com-
pany had violated the special regulations governing its operations in
order to hold the latter answerable for damages. The plaintiffs had shown
that their wax refinery had suffered from the oily smoke rising above
the station and then descending upon their establishment. It was then
for the trier of fact to declare whether the interference had exceeded the
measure of the ordinary rights and obligations of the neighborhood and,
if so found, to order the railroad to indemnify the plaintiffs to the extent
of the deterioration of their merchandise and the actual depreciation of
their plant. The courts have likewise adhered to the principle that the
maintenance of a policed brothel (maison de tolerance) does not change
its immoral character nor legitimize its existence, but merely assures its
supervision.74
The fact that courts have been intervening in activities authorized by
administrative bodies in order to protect private rights has provoked
discussion concerning the separation of powers. 75 The courts, however,
have not retreated from the position taken in Derosne v. Puzin, and have
reasserted their power to pass upon questions of harm to third persons
and their full competence to order that preventive measures be taken
providing these measures are not in conflict with those imposed in the
public interest by the executive branch. 6 Nonetheless, the courts have
felt that their discretion in ordering additional works, though not in
conflict with the administrative regulations, must be confined within the
following limits: (i) Regulated establishments-Additional works may
be ordered to a point short of suppression. Complete suppression, or
closure, may be required only by the administrative authorities where
the establishment has failed to comply with their rules. If the award of
damages or the expense of additional works entails cessation of the oper-
ations of the defendant enterprise, this fact is considered purely for-
tuitous and would not be equated to an order of suppression; (ii) Non-
regulated establishments-Additional works may be required on the
pain of closure."
74 Supp., Prostitution-Proxn6tisme nos. 80-91. Since their abolition, these are no longer
a problem. See La loi du 13 avril 1946 tendant b. la fermeture des maisons de tolerance, D.
1946. L. 177.
75 On the question of the separation of powers, see Von Mehren, op. cit. note 24, supra
at 138-249 and David et al., op. cit. note 32, supra at 29-36.
76 Senac v. Socd6t6 du Gaz de Toulouse, Civ., 26 mars 1873, D.P. [1873] 1. 353 (gas
works); Decroix, Vi6ville et Cie. v. jet-Brunet et Picot, Req., 11 juin 1877, D.P. [1878]
1. 409 (water pollution); Demouy v, Cain, Req., 18 novembre 1884, D.P. [1885] 1. 71
(brickmaking yard).
77 Ripert, Note, D.P. [1907] 1. 385; Supp., Industrie et 'Commerce no. 105; Prostitu-
tion-Prox6n6tisme nos. 80-91 Supp., Ed. note, D.P. [1873] 1. 353. On occasion, a court may
not be overly enthusiastic about its "judicial zoning" chores. Thus, in Gilet v. Laurens,
Bordeaux, 5 mars 1903, D.P. [1908] 2. 49, involving the pungent odors of a fishmarket, the
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There has been well-founded criticism that the nineteenth century
courts allowed the theory to lag behind the judiciary's activities. The
courts did not articulate the grounds upon which Article 1382 was in-
voked in respect to interferences that were neither intentionally harmful
nor attributable to the actor's negligence or imprudence. For this reason,
the case of Dupont v. Lacante7 8 has been hailed as another landmark in
the French jurisprudence of interferences with the use and enjoyment of
land. It professedly marks a point of departure from a period of con-
fusion by declaring that an owner who causes to its neighbor harm that
exceeds the measure of the ordinary obligations of the neighborhood
commits a fault by that very fact.79
In fact, an earlier case involving a dispute between honest citizens
and the keepers of a bawdy house had handled the same matter with no
less directness. In Nelatou et Pouchouloux v. Ceunot, ° the Cour de
Cassation set out the law in these terms:
. . . the exercise of ownership ceases to be legitimate and assumes the
character of fault at the very instant it produces a grave and serious
harm to a neighbor whose rights are neither less certain nor less respect-
able; . .. in cases of a conflict between these two sets of rights it is for
the courts to regulate and determine the proportion in which the incon-
veniences of the neighborhood must be borne; . . . the challenged judg-
ment declares in effect that, from the point of view of the respondents, the
inconveniences and dangers, represented by the proximity of the ap-
pellants' establishment, exceeded the measure of tolerance imposed by the
character of the neighborhood; ... [an examination of the circumstances
of this case] inescapably shows fault by implication [cette appreciation
souvrainement faite implique une jaute] and an obligation on the part of
those who have committed it to repair the damage caused.soa
A great deal of difficulty arises in the attempt to assign the fault by
implication to a separate compartment. Its retreat from a predominantly
subjective standard, no doubt, gives it distinction. At the same time,
however, all the alleged variants of fault are founded upon unreasonable-
ness under the circumstances. The fault by implication is merely de-
duced by considering additional factors that some time ago might have
been regarded as irrelevant. Because of this change, old terms are ac-
quiring new contents. Thus, "precautions" may previously have meant
steps taken by a reasonable user of land to protect his neighbor from
excesses measured in terms of the particular use. Today, "precautions"
court bluntly stated that it did not intend to act as a comit6 d'hygiine and ruled for the
defendant.
78 Civ., 18 f~vrier 1907, D.P. [1907] 1. 385.
79 See Ripert, Note, D.P. [1907] 1. 385. A closer reading of the opinion, however, dis-
closes the same two conditions found in the Joachim and Scaramus cases. See supra notes
66-68.
80 Civ., 3 dicembre 1860, D.P. [1861] 1. 331.
80a Id. at 334.
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may mean protective steps taken to insure non-interference in the con-
text of the whole neighborhood. What was "unavoidable" in the particular
"fuse" was tolerated under the earlier standard. What is "ordinary" for
the "neighborhood" is tolerated under the new.
Fault by Implication Rejected
The concept of fault by implication is a handy instrument but it has
not been relied on in every instance. Apart from those court opinions
which express the same concept in different words,81 there are several
cases rejecting its very essence. The idea that fault should be determined
solely by reference to the quality of conduct shows great tenacity and is
supported by several decisions. Only five months after Dupont v. La-
cante, 2 the Chambre des Requites, in Carri~re v. Paul Palaysi,3 held
that since a bad odor was "inherent in the very existence" of Palaysi's
slaughterhouse and since the plaintiff had not been able to prove "an
abusive act, negligence or fault of any kind" in allowing the odor to
escape, the action failed.84 A similar test was used in Avoy v. Chenavaz, 5
where suit was brought by a radio-owning resident against a neighboring
merchant. The complaint averred that the merchant's electric bell (in-
stalled to signal the arrival of customers) was emitting parasitic waves
that interfered with the plaintiff's radio reception. The court denied relief
on the ground that it had not been alleged that the use of the doorbell
had been abusive or had not conformed to its intended use. Cie G~ndrale
des Omnibus v. Mayer 6 has also been cited as rejecting the concept of
fault by implication.17 There, a homeowner complained that the de-
fendant's defectively constructed scuttling busses were creating an un-
bearable noise. The court did not apply a test different from the estab-
lished formula; rather, it seems that the court decided against the plain-
tiff on the ground that the latter had failed to prove the alleged damage,
namely, a decrease in the value or actual physical deterioration of the
property that was due to the bus traffic.
APPLICATION OF THE "ORDINARY OBLIGATIONS" TEST
The "ordinary obligations of the neighborhood" test is not mechan-
ically applied. Various factors are weighed by the courts in order to
81 See, for example, Sobraqu~s v. Clottes, Montpellier, I f~vrier 1933, D.H. [1933] 212
(the exercise of ownership is limited by the legitimate rights of neighbors).
82 Note 78, supra.
83 Req., 24 juillet, D.P. [1908] 1. 62.
84 For an earlier "inherence" argument, see Albareil v. Vigouroux, Agen, 7 f6vrier 1855,
D.P. [1855] 2. 302.
85 Lyon, 13 juiliet 1932, D.H. [1933] Somm. 24. Reversed by Civ., 29 mai 1937, D.H.
[1937] 394.
86 Paris, 6 f~vrier 1913, D.P. [1913] 2. 393.
87 Lalou, Note, D.P. [1922] 2. 49.
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arrive at what they consider to be a just solution of the facts before them.
Some of the factors are relevant in solving all conflicts of land use in a
given neighborhood (e.g., the character of the neighborhood); certain
others will vary with the particular case (e.g., the nature and extent of
the harm). Since the object of the courts in every case is to ascertain
whether the defendant's conduct has been reasonable under the circum-
stances, it would be profitable to have a single test embodying all the
relevant considerations, 8  but while fault founded on personal blame is
retained side by side with objectively determined social fault, any unitary
analysis is likely to break down.
Character of the Neighborhood
The sum of the inconveniences which the inhabitants of a neighbor-
hood have to endure varies with the location of the immovable property.
An interference which will appear reasonable in an industrial suburb or
on a commercial street may be actionable if the properties involved are
situated in a tranquil residential district.8 9 Of course, it is quite possible
that even a resident of a heavily industrialized area will be able to show
that amidst all the activity certain user stands out as particularly of-
fensive. The Chambre des Requites held in Socijt6 Commerciale v. Rou-
boud90 that even in an industrial seaport city, the establishment of a coal-
yard, from which dust was carried over the surrounding area penetrating
and rendering uninhabitable the plaintiff's home and destroying his gar-
den, exceeded the measure of the ordinary obligations of the neighbor-
hood. 1 By contrast, in Robert v. Schor,'2 the court held that the de-
fendant had not violated the neighborhood obligations by maintaining a
dunghill in front of his house, because such was the common practice
among the inhabitants of the village. Furthermore, the court pointed out,
the same custom prevailed in almost all rural communities, despite at-
tempts to discourage it by agricultural experts and authorities admin-
istering public health.
Priority of Occupation
At one time there was respectable support for the theory of droit de
preoccupation which did not allow an action by a newcomer to a locality
88 Cf. 4 Restatement, Torts §§ 826-31 (1939). See note 68a, supra and note 102, infra.
89 Compare: Rivoire v. Imbert, 28 f6vrier 1848, D.P. [1848] 1. 122 (noisy and malo-
dorous tool plant in an industrial neighborhood) and Nelatou et Pouchouloux v. Ceunot,
3 d6cembre 1860, D.P. [18611 1. 331 (bawdy house in a quartier paisible et honnfte). See
also Capitant, Note, D.P. [19081 2. 49.
90 Req., 19 avril 1905, D.P. [1905] 1. 256.
91 See also Ville de Paris v. Muzard, Paris, 9 d6cembre 1904, D.P. [1905] 2. 32:
Although the inhabitants of a large city are held to a certain tolerance among them-
selves as regards discomforts resulting from the density of population, this tolerance
does not have to be extended to notable and serious inconveniences.
92 Besangon, 15 novembre 1934, D.H. [1935] 25.
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against a person or establishment of previous occupancy. Industrial
expansion, however, insured that no such rule became fixed. The op-
ponents to a firm rule of preoccupation argued that a property owner in
a modern society must realize that the place he occupied, though isolated
at first, could not operate to delay new uses in the neighborhood.94 Later,
the same industrial interests that evidently had helped to defeat the rule
of prioccupation found themselves looking down the muzzle of their own
gun. On many an occasion industrial enterprises were the first to move
into an area with residential districts subsequently appearing in the same
locality. Their attempts to revive the rule of preoccupation and to invoke
it in their own behalf have not been successful. Thus, in Gagey-Seguin et
Mathenet v. Jeamel,95 Jeamel claimed that the noise escaping from the
defendants' coppersmith business forced his tenants to keep their win-
dows closed and did not allow them to carry on normal conversations.
The defense of priority of occupation was raised but the court ruled that
this factor did not go to the determination of fault but only to the mitiga-
tion of damages.
The Cour de Cassation reportedly dealt with this question for the first
time in Dupont v. Lacante9 6 In affirming the rulings of the lower courts,
it held that it mattered very little that the defendant's offensive tile fur-
nace had been in operation, without provoking complaints, prior to the
erection of the plaintiff's dwelling.
The doctrine of non-conforming uses, however, appears as an exception
to the absence of a rule of priority of occupation. The establishment of a
use that is entirely inconsistent with the existing nature of 'the neighbor-
hood may destroy the actionability of an interference by the prior user.97
Residential use, however, is not considered such non-conforming use,98
except in cases of prioccupation collective. If an entire district has been
turned over to industry, the character of the neighborhood has become
fixed and a person who later sets up a residence within that district will
not be heard to complain; his will be the non-conforming use.99
Type of Harm
The French law protects persons from both physical harm (prijudice
materiel) and mental harm (prejudice moral). The defendant in Noual-
hier v. Delage0 ° converted her dwelling into a tuberculosis hospital. As
93 Ripert, Note, D.P. [1907] 1. 385.
94 Rep., Industrie et Commerce no. 211.
95 Dijon, 10 mars 1865, D.P. [1865] 2. 144.
96 Note 78, supra. See Ripert, Note, D.P. [1907] 1. 385.
97 Capitant, Note, D.P. [1908] 2. 49.
98 Ripert, Note, D.P. [1907] 1. 385.
99 Ibid.
100 Limoges, 5 fivrier 1902, D.P. [1902] 2. 95.
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a result, rental values of the nearby houses fell and, in many cases, the
homes remained vacant. The plaintiff, whose property adjoined the hos-
pital, claimed to have been damaged by the defendant's use of her land.
In awarding damages to Delage, the cour d'appel reaffirmed the principle
that, in order to be actionable, an interference did not have to leave
traces which were physically determinable; it sufficed that the harm
manifested itself in a mental hurt or in a property depreciation capable
of being evaluated. The opinion in Quasquara v. Francezon'° ' conveys
the same idea in somewhat different words, namely, that a simple dis-
comfort is sufficient if it assumes an abnormal character. Looking at the
lower end of the spectrum of mental harm, a contrary interest alone, it
has been said, would not effectively thwart the exercise of ownership.
Hence, a neighbor cannot, on the pretext of annoyance that would result
to him, preclude his neighbor from erecting on the latter's land such
structures as may suit him. 02
An action for the protection of physical and mental security will be
entertained if these interests have actually been harmed (prijudice ac-
tuel) or if the impending harm (prejudice eventuel) is serious and im-
minent. The application of the principle is sometimes a very delicate
matter as it is almost impossible to determine by general rules when an
eventuality of harm is imminent. 0 3 It is generally conceded that a neigh-
bor of a building in danger of collapse has an action against its owner to
compel repairs. °4 In Chiron v. Faisandier,1°0 an order was granted to
remove a wooden addition to a party wall on the ground that the struc-
ture constituted a fire hazard. Although no damage of any kind had yet
resulted, it was regarded to be imminent. Also, the Cour de Cassation
held, in Floret v. Zunino,'°6 that where a municipal ordinance had pro-
hibited the use of explosives in quarries within a certain distance from
human habitations, a resident of this zone had a cause of action against
the defendant blaster who had not observed the distance requirement,
even if no actual harm could be proved. From these cases the following
generalization can be derived: there is a ground for an action to suppress
activities or conditions which, though not causing any present harm, can
101 Rouen, 4 mars 1953, D. [1953] Somm. 72.
102 Rfp., Propri6t6 no. 160. This probably refers to building types and does not include
"spite structures." Annoyances created by design would most likely be considered "insub-
stantial," i.e., resulting in no harm, even if the style were chosen with an intent to annoy
a neighbor.
103 Ed. note, D.P. [18571 2. 71; Ed. note D.P. [1902] 2. 95; Supp., Action no. 32; Petit
Dictionnaire note 51, supra at 37.
104 Heurtel v. Leguen, Rennes, 23 mars 1843, D.P. [1844] 2. 122. Cf. Alectricit6 de France
v. Follot, Civ., 19 mars 1947, D. [1947] J. 313, in which a Fr.10,000 judgment for eventual
harm from high tension lines was reversed.
105 Bordeaux, 18 mai 1849, D.P. [1850] 2. 86.
105 Civ., 29 juillet 1886, D.P. [1886] 1. 165.
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in the future entail damage the reparation of which would be much more
difficult.11 7 By comparison, the Cour de Douai, in Haueisz v. Lespagnol
de Grimbry,05 reversed a lower court order under which the defendant
owner of a small textile mill was to execute certain works to minimize
the fire hazard to other properties. The fact that the materials worked
and stored in the mill were more combustible than the ordinary contents
of buildings did not allow the court to analogize this situation to one in
which the building was in a danger of immediate collapse.
While the source of a threatened harm will be suppressed in certain
instances, actual harm must be shown in order to entitle the plaintiff to
pecuniary compensation. 0 9 An interesting problem arises when the da-
mage claimed, although measurable in monetary terms, is referrable to
a legal cause having the character of a chance event. In Piquart v. Bren-
ikre, 1 ° the defendant established a sawmill in an industrial neighborhood.
As a result, the rates for fire insurance on the nearby buildings increased.
Breni~re claimed, among other things, damages equal to his loss on
account of the rate differential. The Cour de Cassation did not reach the
issue of the contingent harm disposing of the case on the ground of ab-
sence of fault. It stressed the precautions taken by the defendant and
the industrial character of the neighborhood. An editorial note appended
to the report expressed the opinion that, even absent these considerations,
no recovery could have been had for the reason that the real causal
event (the fire damage) was contingent, uncertain and hypothetical."'
Events Beyond Defendant's Control, Complainant's
Negligence or Imprudence, and Acquiescence
The case of Ribouleau v. Nicoleau"2 arose in the hilly Charente pro-
vince. A rock-slide originating on the defendant's land had damaged the
plaintiff's property. The slide had not been a result of any activity under-
taken by the defendant nor did it derive from any failure on his part
to take precautionary measures. Rather, it had been due to the nature
of the soil and to the atmospheric conditions. In denying recovery, the
court noted that those who erect structures at the foot of a mountain
ought first to examine the conditions of the terrain.
107 Note, D.P. [1857] 2. 71.
108 Douai, 16 aofit 1856, D.P. [1857] 2. 71.
109 But see Cie d'Eclairage et Chauffage v. de Guiringaud, Req., 6 mars 1934, D.P. [1937]
1. 17. The electric company had attached wire-carrying insulators to the walls of the plain-
tiff's house in violation of administrative regulations. The Court held that even if no
physical harm was shown, the plaintiff was entitled to pecuniary damages to compensate
her for the mere invasion of her rights. Note the similarity to the common law trespass to
land.
11o Civ., 11 novembre 1896, D.P. [1897] 1. 10.
11 Ed. note, D.P. [1897] 1. 10.
112 Poitiers, 6 mai 1856, D.P. [1856] 2. 182.
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Harm to buildings brought about by unstable soil is a relatively com-
mon interference, but whenever the shift has been initiated by human
agency the defense of uncontrollable events apparently is not available. 113
In such a case, however, the defendant may escape liability by demon-
strating the absence of unreasonable conduct on his part while pointing
to his opponent's negligence or imprudence. Thus, in Drouet v. L'Indus-
trielle Fonciere,"4 the soil of the district in question had some peculiar,
though discoverable, weaknesses. The plaintiff had built his house without
taking the special care required by the condition of the soil. When the
defendant was later erecting a building on its land, with a proper regard
for structural necessities, it was unaware of the fact that the plaintiff's
house had been defectively constructed. The latter was damaged by a
soil-shift. The tribunal held for the defendant." 5
When an occurrence beyond human control is combined with the de-
fendant's negligence or imprudence, the human conduct often appears
to be more determinative of the defendant's liability than does the act
of God." 6 In Mulard v. Lesourd,"1 the plaintiff's lands were flooded
following an unusually heavy downpour. Although recognizing the un-
controllable character of the event, the Cour de Cassation held the de-
fendant liable for his failure to open his sluice-gates in time to lower
the water level.
In every one of the foregoing cases the defense goes to the question
of fault. When fault has been established by implication, a fact that
would constitute a defense in Anglo-American equity may not necessarily
have that effect in French law. In Nublat v. Gilibert,"8 the plaintiff had
lived next to Gilibert's noisy stables for fifteen years. The Cour de
Cassation, in reversing the appeals court, held that once the interference
had exceeded the measure of the ordinary obligations of the neighbor-
hood, even this prolonged acquiescence was no defense to the plaintiff's
action.
THm RoLE OF ARTICLES 1384, 1385 AND 1386
Article 1384
Some commentators have suggested that the phrase"... but also for
that caused by the acts of persons for whom he is responsible or by things
under his guard. . . ." in paragraph 1 of Article 1384 was nothing more
than a transitional device employed by the legislator to connect those
a3 See, for example, Cridit Lyonnais v. Ardisson, note 58, supra.
114 Tr. civ. Seine, D.H. [1933] Somm. 20.
115 Accord: Dumont v. Colnet, Req., 11 mai 1853, DP. [1853] 1. 163.
116 There is no sharp distinction in French law between force majeure and cas fortuit.
Amos et al., op. cit. note 46, supra at 195-196.
"1T CiV., 31 juillet 1912, D.P. [1914] 1. 144.
I's Civ., 4 d~cembre 1935, D.H. [1936] 70.
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Articles which treated damage done by responsible human beings (articles
1382 and 1383) with those discussing damage caused by persons under
the command of others (the remaining paragraphs of Article 1384),
by animate things under the supervision of persons (Article 1385), and
by buildings (Article 1386)J. The court decisions, however, have made
full use of this provision and have developed from it a theory of "liability
without fault" (responsabilitM sans faute or thorie du risque du pro-
priWt ). The whole area of industrial and automobile liability for in-
stance, exists by grace of this theory.2 ° There were also some equivocal
attempts to extend its application to interferences with the use and en-
joyment of land but the idea was abandoned after a brief period of
experimentation.
In Dr. Vidal v. Leriche,12' it was found that the plaintiff doctor had
a fine, properly installed radio set, that Dame Leriche had in her hotel
an electric phonograph, the motor of which was emitting parasitic waves
that interfered with the plaintiff's radio reception, that these disturbances
were caused solely by the defendant's motor, that the only practical
remedy was the replacement of the motor, and that a new motor was
available on the market and was easy to procure. The defendant was so
ordered and, in addition, was required to pay Fr.500 for past damage.
• . . [B]y operating the motor the defendant has committed a fault
and caused harm to the plaintiff; . . . the latter has been deprived,
abusively and without right, of the advantages and enjoyment which
he was rightfully entitled to derive from listening to his radio.121a
The tribunal did not cite any code provision; therefore, it is not clear
on what theory its decision rested. However, in affirming the judgment
the appeals court referred to Article 1384 as the apparent legal basis
for the lower court's decision. '
The application of this controversial paragraph conceivably could
have been restricted to inanimate movable things, in view of the fact
that Article 1385 deals with animals and Article 1386 with immovables.
Liability under 1386 is, however, limited to cases where a building has
been either improperly maintained or defectively constructed. This ap-
proach, therefore, evidently was too restrictive Sor the courts and they
proceeded to broaden the scope of the paragraph to include immovables
as well. They imposed liability upon the owner of immovable property
for incendiary damage to his neighbors' properties, the fire having orig-
119 Lalou, Note, D.P. [1922] 2. 49.
120 See generally Von Mehren, op. cit. note 24, supra at 367-414.
121 Tr. Civ. Pas-de-Calais, 30 janvier 1930, D.H. [1930] 248.
121a Ibid.
122 Douai, 1 d~cembre 1930, D.H. [1931] Somm. 44.
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inated with the former but without fault on his part, and upon a factory
of asphyxiating gases for the harm caused neighboring truck gardens by
an explosion. Similarly, an electric company was held responsible for
the electrocution of a customer..2 3 Peauger v. Banque de Francel24
belonged to this body of jurisprudence. It, however, went a bit further
by extending the applicability of paragraph 1 from man-made to natural
immovable objects. The defendant bank owned a large garden of plata-
nus trees planted at the legal distance from the property line. Yet, each
autumn the deciduous leaves were driven by the wind over to the plain-
tiff's property and deposited there to his inconvenience. The court held
for the plaintiff on two grounds. It relied first on the theory of Article
1384, saying, in effect, that the leaves were in the custody of the defen-
dant. The defenses of force majeure and cas fortuit were not available.
Similarly, the defendant was not allowed to invoke as a defense the
fact that the legal distance had been observed, nor was he allowed to
show that the falling of the leaves was natural and could not be halted
by man. The court's opinion also rested on the theory of Article 1382
(fault by implication).
This extension of jurisprudence fell in disgrace and within a relatively
short time was repudiated in contrary decisions. In the case of Commune
de Vic-Fdzensac,2 5 the Conseil d'.Atat held that the harm (additional
maintenance costs and physical deterioration through water seepage
caused by clogged gutters and downspouts) caused to a private building
by leaves fallen from public trees was one that did not, on the facts,
exceed the measure of the ordinary constraints (suj~tions) of the neigh-
borhood. One writer thinks that the Conseil absolved the municipality
from all liability in order to preserve the beautiful vegetation adorning
public avenues and squares. The Conseil must have suspected that muni-
cipal authorities would rather remove the trees than pay damages out
of the public till. 2 6 Technically, it was not difficult to reach such a
decision. Neither the civil code nor the jurisprudence of the civil courts,
e.g., the extension of Article 1384, have any direct effect upon the system
of the administrative courts. Moreover, by adopting the reasoning of
civil courts under Article 1382 (fault by implication) the same result
could have been reached on the facts before the Conseil. Conversely,
this decision did not become part of the jurisprudence of the civil
123 Lalou, Note, D.P. [1922] 2. 49.
124 Limoges, 20 juin 1921, D.P. [1922] 2. 49. Accord: Le Mentec v. Collin, Tr. paix Can-
cale, 3 dcembre 1946, D. [1947] J. 107.
125 Conseil d'etat, 24 juillet 1931, D.P. [1931] 3. 51.
126 P.-L. J., Note, D.P. [1931] 3. 51.
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courts.1 7 However, a few decades later, in Le Molt v. Maclzeo,128 the
Cour de Cassation itself discarded the principle announced in the Peauger
case and held that paragraph 1 of Article 1384 did not provide a legal
basis for finding that the falling of leaves had given rise to an actionable
harm. The practical importance of this decision is great; in so far as
non-intentionally and non-negligently created neighborhood inconven-
iences are concerned, the complainant now must stand on Article 1382
and not 1384.129
Article 1385
Interferences by animals are quite common and furnish abundant
material for judicial experimentation. In most instances, liability has
been predicated on Article 1382 rather than 1385. Apart from a few
earlier cases, 8 0 Article 1385 appears to have been applied only to domes-
tic animals . 31 But even admitting that Article 1382 has become the ac-
cepted basis of actions for damage done by wildlife, the problem of fault
has by no means been satisfactorily resolved. The concept of fault by
implication has not acquired a sure foothold in this area. Likewise, the
dimensions of the other bases of fault are not easily ascertainable.
The Cour de Cassation, in Cagi v. Girard et Voyet,1 2 held that an
owner of hunting rights was not liable for damage done by rabbits to
the neighbors' crops, unless it could be shown that he had favored their
multiplication and had neglected to destroy them. The defendant's failure
to keep his wire lattice enclosure tight so as to protect the surrounding
fields, was not conduct indicative of his fostering the multiplication of
the rodents. Therefore, this fact, standing alone, could not constitute a
fault, by negligence or otherwise. About fifty years earlier the Chambre
des Requites had arrived at an exactly opposite conclusion in Chaillou
v. Rougereau"'3 by holding the owner at fault under Articles 1382 and
1383 for his failure to keep his fences in good repair. The Gag6 decision
perhaps reflects the present state of the law. 34
127 On the side-by-side existence of the two court systems, see David et al., op. cit. note
32, supra at 45-46.
128 Civ. 21 juillet 1953, D. [1953] J. 573.
129 Ed. note, D. [1953] J. 573. The Court has reiterated this principle very recently in
Knauss v. Pasquet, Civ., 29 f~vrier 1956, D.S. [1956] Somm. 22.
130 See: Clary v. Paillet, Req., 7 mars 1849, D.P. [1849] 1. 149; De la Rochefoucault v.
Brault, note 137, infra.
131 Harm caused by wildlife entails liability of the landowner by reason of Article 1382
and not 1385: Selier v. Bazille, Civ., 4 novembre 1941, DA. [1942] 50; Bal v. de Temmer-
mann, Tr. civ. Provins, 27 juillet 1948, D. [1948] Somm. 40. On harm by domestic animals,
see Lafont v. Fite, Nimes, 8 f6vrier 1950, D. [1950] 321.
132 Civ., 6 janvier 1948, D. [1948] J. 126.
13 Req., 1 mai 1899, D.P. [1900] 1. 549.
134 Apparent accord: Association des Chasseurs de Ferricy v. Meng, Civ., 24 mai 1950,
D. [1950] Somm. 52; Godin v. Tricoteaux, Civ., 2 mars 1956, D.S. [1956] Somm. 152;
Carpentier v. Pinot, Civ., 18 avril 1956, D.S. [1956] Somm. 152.
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At about the turn of the century there was a group of cases that held
an owner of woods, or of hunting rights in woods, liable for damage done
to neighboring fields not only where he had encouraged the multiplica-
tion of the animals but also where he had failed to take all the necessary
measures to keep their number down. Liability was predicated on fault
under Articles 1382 and 1383.111 This trend induced an eminent com-
mentator to write that a fault, as a legal basis for the condemnation of
the owner, was present whenever it was demonstrated that the wild
animals had been present "in excessive numbers," notwithstanding the
fact that the owner might have had no way of keeping them down .83
This was really a "fault by implication" creeping into the animal world.
It was at this time that De la Rochefoucault v. Brault,17 in referring
to both Articles 1383 and 1385, held that the owner of a rabbit warren
was liable for the harm caused by the rodents even in the absence of
any proven "fault, imprudence or negligence." The decision was im-
mediately labeled as "un veritable abus de l'ide de responsabiliM."38
The trend subsequently dissipated, and today Article 1385, along with
paragraph I of Article 1384, has been ousted from the droits de voisinage,
excepting interferences by domesticated animals. There is, however, an
occasional reference to the contrary. In Quasquara v. Francezon,139 the
defendant had set up thirteen bee hives on his suburban property which
was located in a neighborhood consisting of residences surrounded by
small gardens. The plaintiff's only complaint was that the bees were
frightening him to his damage. The cour d'appel held for the plaintiff,
saying that any animal, domestic or otherwise, could make its gardien
liable by virtue of Article 1385 which was applicable irrespective of the
nature of the damage.
Artile 1386
Article 1386, with its special requirements of proof, has preempted the
field of harm caused by the collapse of buildings. Paragraph 1 of Article
1384, therefore, does not form a legal basis of recovery for such harm. 4 0
135 Wallace v. Bonin, Req., 8 juillet 1890, D.. [1891] 1. 452 (wild boars); Moncuit v.
Becquey, Civ., 7 janvier 1891, D.P. [1891] 1. 452 (rabbits); Romand v. Barbier, Req. 24
f6vrier 1904, D.P. [1904] 1. 334 (wild boars); Seydoux v. Lepousez, Req., 14 mars 1905,
D.P. [1905] 1. 270 (rabbits).
136 Planiol, Note, D.P. [1900] 1. 549.
137 Req., 29 octobre 1899, D.P. [1900] 1. 432.
138 Planiol, Note, D.P. [1900] 1. 549.
139 Note 101, supra.
140 Combes-Gonthies v. Moucheron, Montpellier, 25 octobre 1949, D. [1950] J. 99. But
compare the much broader rule in Pallois v. Dalivout, Civ., 26 juin 1924, D.P. [1924]
1. 159.
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
REMEDIES
The topic of remedies is too broad to be extensively treated here. It
should suffice merely to point out some of the kinds of relief available
to French plaintiffs in cases of interferences with the use and enjoyment
of land. It is generally within the discretion of a judge to decide whether
to limit the offensive activity or condition (r~paration en nature), or to
confine the plaintiff to solely a monetary reparation (rdparation en
argent). Elimination of the objectionable activity or condition is prob-
ably the prime desire of the courts, but where this would entail a dis-
continuance adverse to the public interest, monetary compensation is
ordinarily given.' 4'
Negatory Action (Action Ngatoire)
What we at common law accomplish by an action of nuisance, can, to a
certain extent, be achieved in the French law by the negatory action, i.e.,
a declaratory action relating only to the freedom from servitudes. In
contrast to the Roman law, but alike to the situation in Germany, it is
available regardless of the disturber's claim of servitude-a right to
disturb. Since this action cannot compensate the plaintiff for past harm
nor prevent future interference, it has but limited utility and is, appar-
ently, used to cut short attempts to acquire rights by prescription.'42
Damages (Dommages Int~rats)
An action for money damages is the most common remedy. Compensa-
tion for past and/or prospective 43 harm may be claimed either separately
or in conjunction with other relief, such as the execution of additional
works or the imposition of regulations. The expenses of litigation (ordin-
ary court costs and costs of experts) are frequently added to the figure
of compensation. 4 In arriving at the figure of damages, courts consider
as many relevant factors as possible, yet some factors, they feel must
be disregarded because of their intangibility or uncertainty. Thus in
Soci 6t des Ciments Portland v. Charpentier,'45 the plaintiffs were com-
plaining of dust emanating from the cement company's plant. A money
judgment was awarded to them based, in the words of the Cour de Cas-
sation, upon the following 6lments actuels et certains: the difficulties
141 Savatier, Note, D.P. [1928] 1. 73. For a general discussion of the various types of
remedies, see Ripert, Note, D.P. [1907] 1. 385.
142 Arminjon et al., op. cit. note 13, supra § 778; Goldschmidt, op. cit. note 7, supra at
123-124; Wolff et al., op. cit. note 7, supra at 347. On the various real actions in the French
law, see Petit Dictionnaire, note 51, supra at 38 and 1173.
3 Since the harm must be actual (see "Type of Harm" p. l-, supra), prospective dam-
ages calculated on the basis of previous experience ought to be subject to subsequent ad-justment. Derosne v. Puzin, note 31, supra.
144 Limouzin v. Arnaudet, Bordeaux, 21 mai 1867, D.P. [1869] 2. 159 (costs and costs
of "expertise"); Sobraqu~s v. Clottes, note 81, supra (costs).
'45 Req., 13 d~cembre 1932, D.H. [1933] 37.
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in the cultivation of their garden, the reduction of the productivity of
the garden, the deterioration of the dwelling and its contents, and the
grave discomfort, if not injury, to the health of the plaintiffs. In Socit&
Mini~re des Terres Rouges v. Poncin et Grosse,4 ' the defendant company
'contended, among other things, that the deterioration of the plaintiffs'
dwellings was not attributable exclusively to the moisture attracted by its
cool-house and, moreover, that in computing the amount of compensation
to be awarded the Soci6t6 should be credited with the value of the benefits
accruing to the plaintiffs because of the presence of the manufacturing
plant. The court held that the depreciation on account of age had been
considered but that the presence of the defendant's blast furnaces was
an undeterminable, pretended benefit, lacking a juridical basis.
The appeals courts have the power to increase the damages if the awards
of the tribunals are inadequate.147 The Cour de Cassation, however, will
not challenge the recoveries since it regards the size of awards as a ques-
tion of fact. 148
Additional Works (Travaux et Rdparations)
A court may order a defendant to execute certain works or repairs
in order to eliminate or minimize interferences with the use and enjoyment
of land by others. By such an order it attempts to accomplish what an
American court would seek to do by means of a mandatory injunction.
Instead of the power to commit for civil contempt,149 the French courts
may rely on l'astreinte to induce performance.
L'astreinte is essentially a judgment for additional damages to compel
performance and may be considered an integral part of the French
jurisprudence. It was developed by the courts following the abolition of
imprisonment for default in civil obligations. It is provisional in nature;
hence, the swelling sum of money is by no means indicative of the plain-
tiff's ultimate recovery. Once the defendant's resistance has been broken,
the court will compute a sum which is commensurate with the actual harm
suffered by the plaintiff. Thus, unless there is some certainty that ap-
preciable harm will actually result in case of non-obedience, l'astreinte
can be an utterly ineffective means of compulsion.5 0 Consequently, when
an award of damages for past harm can reasonably be projected into
146 Colmar, 19 mai 1938, D.H. [1938] 425.
147 See Castella v. Ferrie, Montpellier, 24 juillet 1933, D.H. [1933] 566 (from Fr.l,000
to Fr.10,000) ; Dr. Secret v. Briquet, note 69, supra (from Fr.2,000 to Fr.5,000).
148 David et al., note 32, supra at 107.
149 Execution against the person in civil matters, originally found in Articles 2059-2070,
was abolished by La loi du 22 juillet 1867. On the enforcement of judgments for perform-
ance, including administrative help, see also Von Mehren, op. cit. note 24, supra at 773-776.
150 Dawson, "Specific Performance in France and Germany," 57 Mich. L. Rev. 495,
510-525 (1959); Brodeur, "The Injunction in French Jurisprudence," 14 Tul. L. Rev. 211
(1940); Fr6javille, "L'Astreinte," D. [1949] Chr. 1.
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
the future, the defendant may be less obdurate although, of course, his
resistance might have weakened simply under the threat of consecutive
actions for accrued damages. Coquerel v. Cl6ment-Bayard1I is an ex-
cellent illustration of a case involving the typical remedies plus a condi-
tional authorization of self-help. The court gave the plaintiffs monetary
compensation for the actual physical harm caused their blimp and also
ordered the defendant to remove the spikes within two weeks under the
threat of l'astreinte of Fr.25 for each subsequent day of non-compliance.
Furthermore, if compliance was not forthcoming within a month following
the fourteen-day "grace" period, the plaintiffs were authorized to enter
the defendant's premises and, by employing "workmen of their choice,"
to remove the offending irons. In Gagey-Seguin et Mathenet v. Jeamel,15
the court ordered the defendant's noisy coppersmith shop enclosed in
stone or brick walls. The deadline for performance was set at five months
counting from the day of the judgment under l'astreinte of Fr.12 for each
day of non-compliance.
Optional Decree (Condemnation Facultative)
The optional decree offers to the defendant a choice between the ex-
ecution of certain additional works or repairs to reduce the interference
and the "purchase," so to speak, from the plaintiff of the privilege of
continuing the interference in its previous form. The plaintiff, in Ville de
Paris v. Muzard, 53 was complaining that the clatter of feet in the stair-
way of the adjoining public school was disturbing the guests in her hotel.
The court found that this was a notable and serious inconvenience and
rendered a judgment requiring the city either to pay the plaintiff imme-
diately Fr.20,000 to compensate her for future damage, or to perform
certain additional works and repairs within a month under l'astreinte of
Fr.50 for each day beyond that limit.
Regulation (R~glementation)
In some cases, courts feel that the inconveniences that result from the
activities of a defendant might decrease to a nonactionable level if the
latter were to alter the manner of his operations. The judges may try to
achieve this by prescribing regulations as though they were administrative
officers. Thus, in Castella v. Ferrie,114 the complaint was that Ferrie's
mechanical sawmill was making an intolerable noise and tremor de-
priving the plaintiff of any rest, day or night. The cour d'appel affirmed
the regulation prescribed by the tribunal, namely, that the mill should be
151 Note 53, supra.
152 Note 95, supra.
153 Note 91, supra.
154 Note 147, supra.
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operated only between the hours of 8-12 a.m. and 2-6 p.m. The regime
was backed by a Fr.50 l'astreinte for every proved violation. Similarly, in
Gagey-Seguin et Mathenet v. Jeamel,15 5 the defendants were ordered to
keep the windows of their copper-smithy closed. The effectiveness of
these judicial regulations apparently will vary directly with the probabil-
ity of the plaintiff's obtaining executable money judgments in the future.
CONCLUSION
Conflicts arising out of the use and enjoyment of land in France are
frequently adjusted under the general principles of private law found in
the Code Civil. However, since only a few of the mutual rights and
obligations existing between neighbors have been spelled out in the code,
the bulk of these droits de voisinage is the product of judicial effort. This
body of jurisprudence is a part of the French law of tort (responsibilit6
civile d6lktuelle) that is derived from the five articles1 56 dealing with
delictual liability. In this area, liability is said to be based on fault,
though the fault itself is shedding the connotation of personal blame and
is moving toward an objective criterion. But the traditional ideas of fault
are by no means dead; hence, this existence of a double standard fre-
quently tends to obscure the reasoning in individual cases. Articles 1384
and 1385 have all but disappeared from the field of neighborhood obliga-
tions. It would seem, indeed, that the appearance of the concept of social
fault as a competing basis of liability will gradually displace any coex-
istent theory of liability without fault. It will absorb those elements of
the latter which had made such a theory an indispensable legal tool in
a period when liability founded on moral fault was inadequate to cope
with new conflicts in a more complex society.
On the whole, one is impressed by the fact that French judges, work-
ing within their code system and using different techniques of analysis,
reach results in controlling land use by judicial action that are substan-
tially parallel to those arrived at by their common law counterparts. In
either system the general rules of private law are interpreted and applied
so as to cover present day needs. The process by which this is accom-
plished is largely one of reconciling conflicting interests. It seems, how-
ever, that in terms of enforcement the French law is weaker. While one
can appreciate the reluctance of civil law systems to enforce civil obliga-
tions by measures directed against the obligors' persons, 157 the absence
of an effective substitute is deplorable. L'astreinte may often be a paper
tiger.
155 Note 95, supra.
156 Articles 1382-86, p. 317 supra. See especially Article 1382.
157 See Pekelis,. "Legal Techniques and Political Ideologies," 41 Mich. L. Rev. 665 (1943).
